Shannon (Bell Syst. Tech. J. 27:623-656, 1948; Bell Syst. Tech. J. 28:656-715, 1949) in celebrated work had shown that n bits of shared key are necessary and sufficient to transmit n-bit classical information in an information-theoretically secure way, using one-way communication. Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp and de Wolf in (Proceedings of the 41st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundation of Computer Science, pp. 547-553, 2000) considered a more general setting, referred to as private quantum channels, in which instead of classical information, quantum states are required to be transmitted and only one-way communication is allowed. They show that in this case 2n bits of shared key is necessary and sufficient to transmit an n-qubit state. We consider the most general setting in which we allow for all possible combinations, in oneway communication, i.e. we let the input to be transmitted, the message sent and the shared resources to be classical/quantum. We develop a general framework by which we are able to show simultaneously tight bounds on communication/shared resources in all of these cases and this includes the results of Shannon and Ambainis et al.
Introduction
Suppose Alice is required to transmit an n-bit input string to Bob in an informationtheoretically secure way, i.e. without leaking any information about her input to an eavesdropper Eve who has complete access to the channel between her and Bob. Shannon in [12, 13] had shown that using n bits of shared key and by using one-time pad scheme Alice and Bob can accomplish this. He further showed that n bits of shared key are also required by any other scheme which accomplishes the same using one-way communication. Later Maurer [10] extended this result to show that n bits of key are required even if two-way communication is allowed between Alice and Bob. Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp and de Wolf [1] considered a generalization of this question in which instead of classical input, Alice has quantum input and only one-way of quantum communication between Alice to Bob is allowed. They referred to this setting as a private quantum channel (PQCs). They showed that in this case the requirement of shared key increases. Their main result was: Theorem 1.1. 2n bits of shared key are necessary and sufficient to transmit any n-qubit quantum state in an information-theoretically secure way.
We further generalize the setting by letting the shared resource between Alice and Bob to be quantum. A natural generalization of classical shared keys in the context of quantum communication protocols is a pure quantum state |ψ AB shared between Alice and Bob. This is referred to as shared entanglement or simply entanglement. We consider private quantum channels that use entanglement between Alice and Bob to achieve security, and in order to distinguish them from PQCs which use classical shared keys, we call them PQCEs (the added E stands for entanglement). We formally define a PQCE as follows. Definition 1.2. Let T be a subset of pure n-qubit states. Let |ψ AB be a bipartite pure state shared between Alice and Bob and let ρ be a quantum state.
Alice's operations:
Alice gets an input pure state |φ ∈ T . Alice's operation consists of attaching a few ancilla qubits in the state |0 to her input and her part of the bipartite state |ψ AB . She then performs a unitary transformation on the combined quantum system of all her qubits and sends a subset of the resulting qubits to Bob. Let A represent Alice's operations. For the input |φ , let E(|φ ) represent the (encoded) quantum state of the qubits sent to Bob. We have the following security requirement that ∀|φ ∈ T , E(|φ ) = ρ. 2. Bob's operations: Bob on receiving the quantum message from Alice attaches a few ancilla qubits in the state |0 to the combined system of the received message and his part of the bipartite state |ψ AB . He then performs a unitary transformation on the combined system of all her qubits and outputs a subset of the resulting qubits. On receiving the input she attaches a fixed mixed state ancilla ρ to it, applies a unitary U i depending on the shared random string i on the combined system of the input and the ancilla and sends the resulting qubits to Bob. Please note that we do not make such an assumption here which in any case does not apply for PQCE's. Also it is clear from the above definition that for both PQC's and PQCE's, the operations of Alice and Bob are as general as possible. 4. It is easily seen that a PQCE/PQC for T is also PQCE/PQC respectively forT which is the closure of T under convex combinations. 5. PQCEs were also considered by Leung [6] by the name of Quantum Vernam Cipher who considered issues like security of key recycling and reliability of message transfer. In this paper we are primarily concerned with bounds on communication and entanglement requirements of PQCEs.
We consider the following measures of our various resources. of shared randomness be S(P ). When we say that it requires n bits of shared randomness we mean S(P ) = n.
We consider all possible cases i.e. when the input to Alice, the message sent by Alice and the shared resource between Alice and Bob is either classical or quantum. We develop a general argument by which we are able to show tight bounds simultaneously on communication and shared resource usage in all the above cases. Following is a compilation of all the results we obtain due to our analysis. Below when we say the 'x, y, z' case (e.g. classical, quantum, classical case) we mean, Alice gets n-(qu)bits of x input, the communication is y and the shared resource is z. Remarks.
1. Many of the protocols mentioned above like teleportation, super-dense coding, (2, 3) quantum secret sharing scheme etc. are known to be optimal with respect to different resources like communication, entanglement usage etc. However, these optimality proofs can not be lifted in our setting in a straightforward manner since privacy is often not a consideration in these settings.
2. We only consider perfect privacy in this work. It is known that if perfect privacy is not required then many of the resource requirements can be reduced in different settings. However considering imperfect privacy is beyond the scope of this work.
Consequence for Remote State Preparation
We also present a consequence of our results for one-way, oblivious, remote state preparation (RSP) protocols. In an RSP protocol between Alice and Bob, Alice is required to transport a known quantum state |φ of n-qubits to Bob using classical communication and some shared entanglement. An RSP is called oblivious if at the end of the protocol, Bob gets a copy of Alice's input |φ and rest of his qubits are independent of |φ . Leung and Shor [9] have shown that for one-way oblivious RSPs, if Alice and Bob start with a maximally entangled state then the worst case communication required by them is 2n. We generalize on their result to provide bounds for all one-way oblivious RSP protocols independent of which shared pure state they start with. Organization of the Paper In the next section we make a few definitions and state a few facts which we will be using later in our proofs. In Sect. 3 we present the proofs of all the parts of Theorem 1.4. In Sect. 3.1 we prove our result, Theorem 1.5, for one-way oblivious RSPs. In Sect. 4 we discuss two-way multiple round private quantum channels and conclude with some open questions.
Preliminaries
Let H k represent the Hilbert space of dimension k. Let C k represent the set of quantum states corresponding to the standard basis of H k , also referred to as the classical states. Let I k represent the identity transformation in a k dimensional space. For an operator A let A ≥ 0 represent that A is a positive semi-definite operator. By a quantum operation we mean a linear, completely positive, trace-preserving operation. Let H, K be Hilbert spaces. For a state ρ ∈ K, we call a pure state |φ ∈ H ⊗ K, a purification of ρ if 
Let an EPR pair mean the state |EPR 
= S(A) + S(B) − S(AB).
Relative entropy between two states ρ and σ is defined as S(ρ|σ ) def = Trρ(log ρ − log σ ). We require the following properties of von Neumann entropy, relative entropy and mutual information. Please refer to [11] for a good introduction to quantum information theory.
Fact 2.1.
S(A) + S(B) − S(AB) ≥ 0. This is called a sub-additivity property of von Neumann entropy. This implies I (A : B) ≥ 0. 2. S(ABC) + S(A) ≤ S(AB) + S(AC). This is called the strong sub-additivity property. This implies I (E(A) : B) ≤ I (A : B)
, where E is a quantum operation. 
Given a joint system AB with A being a classical system, S(AB) ≥ max{S(A), S(B)}.
We will need the following theorem. [6] [7] [8] We will also need the following substate theorem from [5] .
Theorem 2.2 (Local Transition Theorem
where Tr|ρ − ρ| ≤ 0.1.
Resource Bounds
We first derive a few lemmas which will finally lead us to our results. In [1] it is shown that a PQC which can transmit n-qubit quantum states can be converted into a PQC which uses the same amount of shared classical randomness to transmit any 2n bit classical state. We show a similar thing for PQCE's. The following lemma states the same. In order to prove this lemma we first prove here another lemma which is very similar to a lemma from [1] . Lemma 3.2. Let H, K be Hilbert spaces. Let E be a quantum operation acting on H such that ∀|φ ∈ H, E(|φ φ|) = ρ. Let |φ 1 , |φ 2 ∈ H be two orthogonal states, then
Proof. We note the following:
Now (1) and (2) imply E(|φ 1 φ 2 |)+E(|φ 2 φ 1 |) = 0 and (1) and (3) 
We get the following corollary of the above lemma:
Corollary 3.3. Let H, K be Hilbert spaces. Let E be a quantum operation acting on H such that ∀|φ ∈ H, E(|φ φ|) = ρ. Then ∀|ψ ∈ K ⊗ H, (I ⊗ E)(|ψ ψ|) = (Tr H |ψ ψ|) ⊗ ρ. This also means that for all mixed states
Proof. Let |ψ = i √ λ i |a i ⊗|b i , be as written in the Schmidt decomposition form. Then,
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. In the PQCE, [C 2 2n , A , B , |ψ AB , I 2 n ⊗ ρ], let x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} n correspond to the input state. Alice prepares n EPR pairs and applies the unitary σ x on combined system of the first qubits of each pair. She then encrypts the combined system of the second qubits of each pair using E, the encryption operation of the PQCE, [H 2 n , A, B, |ψ AB , ρ] . She now sends all the resulting qubits to Bob. From above corollary, we can see that the state of the message of this new PQCE will be I 2 n ⊗ ρ for all inputs in C 2 2n . The decryption operation B of Bob now corresponds to first decrypting the second half of the received qubits using B and then recovering the input classical state by making measurements on the n Bell states.
Below we show a similar lemma which implies that a PQC/PQCE which transmits any n-qubit quantum state can be converted into a PQCE which uses the same communication and an extra n ebits of entanglement to transmit any 2n bit classical state. We show the proof for PQCEs and a similar proof holds for PQCs as well. We will need the following lemma. Although parts of this lemma can be found in standard texts, we state and prove all parts here for completeness. Lemma 3.5. Let ABX be a tripartite system. Then,
S(AX) + S(BX) − S(ABX) − S(X) ≤ min{2S(A), 2S(B)}. 2. If AX is a classical system then we have the stronger inequality S(AX) + S(BX) − S(ABX) − S(X) ≤ min{S(A), S(B)}. 3. I (A : B) ≤ min{2S(A), 2S(B)}.
Proof.
S(AX)− S(ABX) + S(BX) − S(X) ≤ S(AX) − S(ABX) + S(B) ≤ S(B) + S(B) = 2S(B).
Above, the first inequality comes from part (1) and second inequality comes from part (4) of Fact 2.
Similarly we get S(AX) + S(BX) − S(ABX) − S(X) ≤ 2S(A).

S(AX)− S(ABX) + S(BX) − S(X) ≤ S(BX) − S(X) ≤ S(B).
Above, the first inequality arises from part (6), since AX is a classical system, and the second inequality comes from part (1) of Fact 2.1. Again, since A is a classical system, we get
S(AX) − S(X) + S(BX) − S(ABX) ≤ S(AX) − S(X) ≤ S(A).
Above, the first inequality comes from part (6) and the second inequality comes from part (1) of Fact 2.1.
I(A : B) = S(A) + S(B) − S(AB) ≤ S(A) + S(A) = 2S(A).
The inequality above follows from part (4) We now have the following theorem.
S(σ B ) ≥ n/2, where σ B is the quantum state corresponding to Bob's part of |ψ AB . We note from definitions that S(σ B ) = E(|ψ AB ).
S(ρ) ≥ n/2.
Proof. Let X be a random variable which takes values in {1, 2, . . . , 2 n } uniformly. Suppose Alice is able to communicate X to Bob through the PQCE. We can assume that the operations of Alice are safe on X which means that at the beginning Alice makes a copy of X (since it is a classical state) and then her subsequent operations do not touch the original copy of X. Let M 1 be the quantum state corresponding to the message of Alice and let M 2 be the quantum state corresponding to Bob's part of |ψ AB . Then from Fact 2.1,
Above, the first inequality comes from part (2) of Fact 2.1. I (M 1 : X) = 0 because of the privacy property of the channel. I (M 2 : X) = 0 because they were independent to begin with and Alice's operations are safe on X. The last inequality follows from part (1) of Lemma 3.5.
We note in the proof of Theorem 3.6, due to part (2) of Lemma 3.5, that if either M 2 is a classical system (as in a PQC) or if M 1 is a classical system (when the message is classical), then we get n ≤ min{S(M 2 ), S(M 1 )}. Therefore we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3.7.
where σ is Bob's part of |ψ AB , and S(P ) ≥ n.
We are now set to show various parts of Theorem 1.4.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. 1. Follows from part (1) (1) of Corollary 3.7 now implies S(P ) ≥ 2n. The lower bound on communication follows from the fact that a PQC for H 2 n is also a PQC for C 2 n and Part (1) of Corollary 3.7.
7. The lower bound on communication follows from Lemma 3.4 and Part (2) of Corollary 3.7. The lower bound on entanglement follows from the fact that a PQCE for H 2 n is also a PQCE for C 2 n and Part (2) Corollary 3.7.
8. From [H 2 n , A, B, |ψ AB , ρ] using Lemma 3.1 we get a PQCE [C 2 2n , A , B , |ψ AB , I 2 n ⊗ ρ]. Theorem 3.6 now implies E(|ψ AB ) ≥ n. Similarly the lower bound on communication follows from the Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 3.6.
Consequence for One-Way Oblivious Remote State Preparation Problem
In a remote state preparation (RSP) protocol between Alice and Bob, Alice wants to transport a known n-qubit pure state |φ to Bob using classical communication and shared prior entanglement. Such a protocol is called oblivious if at the end of the protocol, Bob gets a single copy of Alice's input |φ and other than that all his qubits are independent of |φ .
Proof of Theorem 1.5. Let us consider an oblivious RSP protocol. Let Alice want to transmit an n-qubit state |φ to Bob. Let ρ be Bob's part of the initial pure state shared between Alice and Bob. Let the state of the shared part of the entanglement on Bob's side after receiving message m to be ρ |φ m . Since the protocol is oblivious, the probability with which a particular message m comes to Bob is independent of |φ , which we denote by p m . Therefore we note m p m ρ |φ m = ρ for all |φ , since the entanglement part of Bob's qubits has not changed due to Alice's operations.
Bob on receiving message m attaches ancilla |0 to his qubits and performs unitary U m to them. Again since the protocol is oblivious, his state at the end of the unitary is |φ φ| ⊗ σ m , where σ m is independent of |φ . Using these properties we now construct a PQC between Alice and Bob. Let Alice and Bob share classical randomness between them in which m is appears with probability p m . Conditioned on the shared string being m, Alice attaches σ m to |φ φ|, applies U † m and sends the resulting state ρ |φ m ⊗ |0 0| to Bob. Now since m p m ρ |φ m = ρ for all |φ , Alice's message is independent of |φ and hence the privacy requirement is satisfied. Bob on receiving the quantum message applies U m to it and discards σ m . Therefore now from part 6 of Result 1.4 we get S(ρ) ≥ n and S(P ) ≥ 2n, where P is the distribution {p m }.
Remark. To the best of our knowledge, the reduction we present here from oblivious remote state preparation to private quantum channels is original and has not appeared in any previous works.
Multiple Round Private Quantum Channels
When we consider two-way multiple round PQCs, denoted MPQC, or multiple round PQCEs, denoted MPQCE, we note that keeping the privacy of individual messages cannot be the only criteria. For example let us consider a protocol in which in the first message Alice transfers EPR pairs followed by a junk message of Bob and then Alice transfers her quantum state privately using the earlier sent EPR pairs. In this protocol none of the individual messages give any information about the transferred state but it does not mean that Eve, who can access the channel in all rounds, cannot get any information about the transferred state. If all the messages are classical, the entire message transcript can be considered together for security requirement. However if some of the messages are quantum, then all of the messages cannot even be considered together. Therefore, we consider following security criterion for MPQC/MPQCE with n-bit (uniformly distributed) classical input: the probability with which an interfering Eve should be able to guess the input of Alice is at most 2 −n .
Below we discuss the resource requirements of MPQCs and MPQCEs with classical inputs. Lemma 4.1. Let P be the distribution of the shared random strings between Alice and Bob in an MPQC for C 2 n . Then S(P ) ≥ n. Proof. Let s be a string which has highest probability according to P , say p. Consider an attack of Eve where she starts acting like Bob (to Alice) and assumes the shared string to be s. In the event that the shared random string between Alice and Bob is s, which happens with probability p, Eve gets to know Alice's input at the end of the protocol. Hence from the security criterion p should be at most 2 −n , which implies S(σ ) ≥ n.
We show a similar statement for MPQCEs. Remark. Consider an implementation of a private quantum channel in which Alice and Bob first use quantum key distribution (QED) protocols like BB84 for key generation and then use these keys to transfer quantum states privately. However it is not strictly an MPQC according to our definition, because current implementations of QEDs require the existence of a classical broadcast channel which is unjammable by Eve. Also such a protocol would not be perfectly secure and there would still be a small amount of information that Eve can obtain even in case Alice does not abort the protocol.
Conclusion
We have considered private quantum channels with one-way communication of all possible kinds and in all the cases we have shown simultaneously optimal resource requirements. Even when we allow two-way communication but if Eve is allowed arbitrary access to the channel, we show that there is not much saving possible on prior entanglement/shared randomness.
It will be interesting to further investigate MPQC/MPQCEs and determine tight resource bounds in different cases as considered for PQC/PQCEs. In connection with RSPs it will be interesting to show similar bounds on resources when we do not have the oblivious condition or for two-way multiple round (non)-oblivious protocols.
